It appears my assertion regarding the government’s reasoning for Operation Cast Lead was correct. Now that Israel seems to be actually winning in Gaza, it seems like Livni and Barak are in favor of an early end to the operation.
“Livni contends that continuing the offensive could harm the deterrence it has achieved so far and damage Israel diplomatically.” Has she not learned anything? Anything Israel does in self-defense will harm Israel’s diplomatic image. Furthermore, she is just throwing around the word “deterrence” for populist reasons. True deterrence will only be restored if Israel truly routs the enemy – if Israel forces a de facto surrender, if not on paper. Stopping now will grant Hamas bragging rights, which are worth a lot more in the Middle East than in kindergarten. Bragging rights practically determine who won and who lost, and Hezbollah has been bragging plenty since 2006.
One last point – Olmert is now against an early end to the operation, accurately stating that “stopping Operation Cast Lead now would be a missed opportunity.” I am really not sure what brought about this change in the outgoing PM. Is this an attempt at some sort of redemption? Can anyone shed some light on the topic?
I truly hope that Israel will not stop yet another operation halfway through. Unfortunately, history shows that the only way to truly gain respect in the Middle East is to be feared. Fear, as a result of a resounding victory. Israel has not won such a victory since 1973 (despite the initial stages of that war). Israel needs to win this war, and stopping it now is not the way to do it.
I predicted a 7-12 day tactical ground operation and it’s now entering the 10th day, so if it ends soon I’ll actually have nailed one!
Olmert is now claiming to support extending the operation not because he supports it, but to be a foil to Barak and Livni. His new position is very low risk, because Barak and/or Livni will have to take the blame if something goes wrong. It also carries potentially high rewards, in that case that the operation is extended, nothing goes wrong and Barak and Livni are made to look like cowards.
I’m very, very surprised that you consider the Yom Kippur War to have been a victory. It very definitely didn’t make anyone fear us (as you probably know, Sadat was assassinated in 1981 at a parade celebrating Egypt’s “October War” victory). In fact, it bears a lot of similarities to our defeat in Lebanon in 2006 … cross-border attack with relatively limited aims, enemy reliance on missiles and rockets, Israel taking the initiative and then stopping in the middle of the counter-attack…
My point on the Yom Kippur War is that there’s no such thing as “winning militarily.” It’s like a football team claiming that they should get one in the W column because they led in rushing, passing, total yards, turnovers, and prettier uniforms. The only thing that matters is how many points you’ve got at the end of the game. And at the end of the game, the Egyptians got the entire Sinai with no Jews left in it, a couple billion dollars a year from the United States taxpayers, some fancy fighter jets, mountains of support from the international community as a “moderate Arab state” and stability for their regime.
You think the Yom Kippur War was just a war to hold positions because that’s what our side, the losing side, wants to think. Actually the enemy set war aims – and for the first time since 1948, they wisely set limited aims that were not primarily territorial – and achieved them.
The fact that Egypt considered it a victory means a hell of a lot. Perception of strength, as you’ve written, is of paramount importance in this region. Correctly or incorrectly, the Egyptians conveyed credibly the notion that they had been victorious, and that became the accomplished fact.
I think there is an extra point that has to be added to your interpretation of the Yom Kippur War, Nobody. Israel got stability in the southwest and a substantial new commitment from U.S. taxpayers as well, which was an explicit quid pro quo to defray the military disadvantage represented by losing control over the Sinai. Furthermore, it got a peace treaty with Egypt that has not only proved durable but precluded another general Arab war against Israel, which was not a viable option for the other Arab states now that Egypt was neutralized. While perception is no doubt important, the constellation of forces is important as well: and in this regard, the war and the diplomatic process afterwards was definitely not an unmitigated defeat for Israel.
In the grand scheme of things Israel is probably losing by points – but I would say that wasn’t the case for a good part of the 1970s. However, Israel did win that war – only to take that victory and turn it into around a few years later. Whether or not the treaty signed with Egypt has turned out to be in the long run or not – there were two major mistakes made:
One, it allowed Egypt the perception of superiority. Israel always does this – the way it grovels before its neighbors, begging for peace. If peace is the object – the Arab states should want it just as much, and if they want war, Israel should be prepared to give it to them.
Two, in addition to adding to Egypt’s image specifically, it destroyed its image in general – giving birth to the myth of land for peace that persists to this day. Israel constantly said it would not give up the eastern strip of Sinai (down to Sharm a-Sheikh), and in the end? Every last inch was handed over. Every last inch. That precedent has been very dangerous – because it renders wars won nearly meaningless, and it raises the expectations of other countries that have lost wars (namely, Syria).
Realist, I’m surprised that you think Israel achieved stability in its southwest from the treaty with Egypt. Considering what’s going on in Gaza now, and Gaza’s history over the last 30 years, I think it is the polar opposite of stability. Even discounting Gaza and just looking at Israel’s border with Sinai, it’s true that no Egyptian armored divisions have crossed it, but neither is it secure. The thousands of African refugees in Tel Aviv all entered Israel by crossing that border and there’s no way to know who else, or what else, is in Israel that came from Sinai.
The money that Israel gets annually from the USA is a disaster for all the parties except for the lobbyists whose job it is to keep it flowing. I don’t know any serious person who doesn’t at least support weaning Israel off of US aid.
What Israel got from the treaty was the opportunity to exchange one existential crisis from another. Before, we faced roughly one must-win conventional war per decade. Now, we face an ongoing low-intensity terrorist war that we’re losing slowly. Personally, I’d take the conventional wars.
If you really think Israel and Egypt are at peace, I invite you to go to Cairo and ask anyone you meet whether Israel is an enemy country. It takes two countries to make peace, and Egypt has simply not made peace with Israel. The regime just gambled wisely on Israelis’ propensity for self-delusion.
LB, what is the difference between “winning the war and turning around the victory” and “losing the war”? I still say that failure is failure, any way you cut it.
I, of course, would have opposed the treaty when it was signed if I had been alive then, and I certainly support throwing it in the garbage now and treating the Egyptian people like the enemy they are (and like they treat us).
Failure is failure – but the failure was not the war itself. In 1974, you could have said Israel had won the war without “turning around the victory” or anything else like that. I don’t think that a present-day failure implies that all wars prior have been failures.
Olmert as a foil does make sense. My point on the Yom Kippur War is that Israel did win militarily, whether or not we could have continued – this, unlike anything since, where the IDF is unable to achieve any real goals. In Yom Kippur, the war was really just a war to hold positions held since 1967 – and the IDF did, in fact, do that and go even farther. The fact that Egypt considered it a victory is pretty meaningless, I think – this is the same country (along with the other Arab states) that even in 1967 claimed all sorts of military victories, and announced them on the radio as the fighting was occurring.